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GRANDPARENT VISITATION RIGHTS IN SOUTH
CAROLINA IN THE WAKE OF TROXEL V.

GRANVILLE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the early twentieth century, the South Carolina Supreme Court
recognized that grandparents have a right to visitation with their grandchildren
under certain circumstances.' In 1981 the South Carolina General Assembly
formalized the right of grandparents to petition for visitation with their
grandchildren by enacting a statute giving the family court the power to award

such rights.2 Like South Carolina, every state now has a statute allowing courts
to award visitation to a child's grandparents under various circumstances.3
Long before the United States Supreme Court considered the question in its last
term, some scholars argued that legislatures must limit statutes allowing
grandparent visitation to protect the constitutional rights of the child's parents.4
In Troxel v. Granville5 the United States Supreme Court held that a
Washington statute allowing grandparents to petition for visitation rights with
their grandchildren unconstitutionally infringed upon the due process rights of
the child's parents.6 In light of the Supreme Court's ruling, state legislatures
should re-examine their grandparent visitation statutes to ensure they are
constitutional.
Part II of this Comment examines the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Troxel v. Granville.Part III addresses Cabralv. Cabral7 and Brice
v. Brice," two state court decisions outside of South Carolina, in which the
courts scrutinize their grandparent visitation statutes using the test from Troxel.

I. See Gill v. Walker, 113 S.C. 39, 42, 100 S.E. 894, 894 (1919) (affirming the circuit
court's grant of custody to the child's aunt, provided "the grandparents ... of the child... have
reasonable opportunity to visit [the child] and have [the child] visit and be with them on proper
occasions and at reasonable intervals"); Douglass v. Merriman, 163 S.C. 210, 212-13, 161 S.E.
452,453 (1931) (upholding the award ofcustody to the child's fatherprovided the order "should
have contained a provision allowing the grandparents to see the little boy involved and to permit
him to visit them at reasonable intervals").
2. See 1981 S.C. Acts 85 (originally codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(18) (Law Coop. 1976)). Two years later, the General Assembly amended the grandparent visitation statute.
1983 S.C. Acts 140 (codified as S.C. CODEANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Law. Co-op. 1976)). The statute
was amended to its current form in 1994. 1994 S.C. Acts 429 (codified as S.C. CODE ANN. § 207-420(33) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999)).
3. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,74 (2000).
4. See Judith L. Shandling, Note, The Constitutional Constraints on Grandparents'
Visitation Statutes, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 118, 118 (1986).
5. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
6. Id. at 72-73.
7. Cabral v. Cabral (In re G.P.C.), 28 S.W.3d 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
8. 754 A.2d 1132 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
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Part IV analyzes the South Carolina law regarding grandparents' visitation
rights and compares it to the guidelines set forth in Troxel and applied in
Cabral and Brice. This Comment concludes that the South Carolina law
regarding grandparents' visitation rights is constitutional under the Supreme
Court ruling in Troxel v. Granville.
II.BACKGROUND
A. Facts andProceduralHistory ofTroxel v. Granville
Troxel v. Granvilleinvolved two children born out of wedlock to Tommie
Granville and Brad Troxel.' After Brad's relationship with Tommie ended in
June 1991, Brad moved in with his parents." The custody decree awarded Brad
visitation with his children on weekends, during which time he often brought
the children to his parents' house."
In 1993, Brad killed himself. 2 For the first five months after his death,
Brad's parents continued to see their grandchildren fairly often.' 3 In October
1993, Tommie restricted them to only one visit with her children per month. 4
The Troxels rejected this limitation, and Tommie declined to let them see their
grandchildren for the next two months.'
The Troxels filed suit asking the Washington Superior Court to award them
visitation rights with their grandchildren. 6 The Washington statute on which
the Troxels based their claim provided: "Any person may petition the court for
visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings.
The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve
the best interest of the child ....
The Troxels sought two weekends of visitation per month and two weeks
of visitation per summer with their grandchildren.' Tommie preferred a more

9. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000); In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 23 (Wash. 1998)
(en banc). Tommie Granville married Kelly Wynn during the appeal of the trial court's order in
the case, and she became Tommie Wynn. See id. at 23; In re Troxel, 940 P.2d 698, 698 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1997).
10. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 60-61.
15. In re Troxel, 940 P.2d at 699.
16. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61.
17. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1997). The Troxels originally petitioned
under two statutes, Sections 26.09.240 and 26.10.16013. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61. Section
26.09.240 was simply a parallel provision in the Washington code, which the legislature
amended to limit third-party petitions for visitation to those instances where a parent has begun
a custody action. In re Troxel,940 P.2d at 700. As a result of the amendment, the Supreme Court
considered only § 26.10.160(3) in its ruling. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61.
18. Id.
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modest visitation schedule of one day a month.' 9 The trial court compromised,
awarding the Troxels visitation one weekend every month, one week each
summer, and a small period of time on the birthday of each grandparent.20
Tommie Granville appealed the order.2'
The Washington Court of Appeals found the Troxels lacked standing to
pursue visitation rights because Washington law permits a third party to
petition for visitation rights only in a pending custody proceeding.' As a result
of this finding, the court of appeals had no reason to decide whether the
2
Washington statute violated the constitutional rights of Tommie Granville. 3
Upon request by the Troxels, the Washington Supreme Court agreed to review
the decision reached by the court of appeals.24
The Washington Supreme Court modified the decision of the appeals court,
holding the Troxels had standing to seek visitation rights under Washington
law. 25 As a result, the supreme court further held that the Washington statute
unconstitutionally infringed upon Tommie Granville's constitutional right to
rear her children.2' The Washington Supreme Court faulted the statute for
failing to require courts to find that a child would be subject to harm if they
deny visitation petitions. 27 In their belief, the statute needed more than the
simple "best interests of the child" standard to provide sufficient protection of
parents' rights.2" The Washington court further criticized the statute for failing
to provide other provisions to protect a parent against groundless petitions for
visitation." The court felt that the statute should have included provisions
forcing the party requesting visitation to show a strong bond with the child and
should require courts to consider the parents' reasons for opposing the
visitation.30

19. Id.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
In re Troxel, 940 P.2d at 701.
Id.
In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 24 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
In re Smith, 969 P.2d at 27.

26. Id. at 27-31. The United States Supreme Court Justices disagreed on whether the
Washington Supreme Court had found the statute was unconstitutional facially oras applied. The
plurality interpreted the Washington Supreme Court decision as a ruling that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75. Justices Thomas and Scalia felt it
unnecessary to address the issue in their opinions. See id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring), 91-93
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The remaining three Justices felt the Washington Supreme Court
invalidated the statute on its face. Id. at 75 (Souter, J., concurring), 81 (Stevens, J., dissenting),
94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
27. In re Smith, 969 P.2d at 30.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 31.
30. Id.
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B. The United States Supreme Court'sAnalysis in Troxel v. Granville
In a plurality opinion, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Washington Supreme Court.3 The plurality held the
Washington statute, as applied to Tommie Granville, violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.32 The Due Process Clause provides:
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
' At issue concerning grandparent visitation is the parents'
due process of law."33
"liberty" to make decisions regarding who the child sees.3 4 In 1923, the
Supreme Court first recognized that the Due Process Clause protects a parent's
right to "bring up children. 3 ' The plurality in Troxel, relying on a long line of
cases beginning withMeyer v. Nebraska,concluded: "In light of this extensive
precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to
36 make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.
The Supreme Court specifically identified two defects in the Washington
statute which caused the statute, in this instance, to violate the Due Process
Clause.37 The first defect, the extreme breadth of the statute, allowed any third
party to question in court a parent's decision concerning who may see their
child.38 More fundamentally, the Washington statute placed the parent's
decision on equal footing with the opinion of a third party because the statute
required that the court give the parent's decision no greaterweight than anyone
else's decision.39 In fact, the Supreme Court criticized the trial judge in the case
for placing the burden ofproof on Ms. Granville, thereby giving greater weight
to the grandparents' petition, rather than Ms. Granville's decision as a fit
parent.40
The Court also discussed the Troxels' failure to allege that Ms. Granville
was unfit to raise her children.4' Since the Troxels conceded Ms. Granville was
a fit parent, the trial court should have presumed that her decisions served the
best interests of her children.42 While the Supreme Court found Ms. Granville's
fitness important, the Constitution does not require a court to find a parent unfit
before granting visitation to a third party.43 When a fit parent opposes a thirdparty petition for visitation, the court must give at least some deference to the
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,75 (2000).
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
Id. at 67, 71.
Id. at 67.
Id.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 68.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68.
See id. at 69.
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decision of the parent." In such a case, special factors must warrant the state's
interference before a court grants visitation rights to a non-parent.45
The second defect in the Washington statute, as applied in this case, also
concerned the trial court's failure to give weight to Ms. Granville's decision.'
Ms. Granville sought only to limit the number of visits the Troxels had with her
children, not prevent them from visiting entirely.4 7 The Supreme Court
criticized the trial court for failing to give any special consideration to Ms.
Granville's decision to allow the Troxels to have some visitation, although not
as much visitation as the Troxels wanted.' The Supreme Court noted that many
other states allow a court to award visitation rights to grandparents only if a
child's parent refuses to let them visit with the child.49 Tommie Granville
allowed her children's grandparents to visit with the children; she merely
disagreed with the grandparents as to how much visitation would be
reasonable, and the Washington court failed to take her opinion into account
when awarding visitation to the Troxels. 5°
Because Troxel is a plurality opinion, the rationale behind the concurring
and dissenting opinions is particularly important. The Justices disagreed over
whether the Washington Supreme Court found the statute facially invalid or
unconstitutional as applied.5 This and other disagreements caused the justices
to file six separate opinions in the case. 2
In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter stated his belief that the
Washington statute violated the Constitution simply because it allowed the
court to award visitation to anyone at any point in time.5 3 The overwhelming
breadth of the statute permitted visitation even if a strong bond with the child
justifying the visitation was not present. 4 Because this flaw rendered the statute
unconstitutional in Justice Souter's view, he did not decide whether a nonparent must show that harm to the child would result if the court denied
visitation rights.5
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas was even more protective of parental
prerogatives. He agreed with the plurality that parents have a "fundamental

44. See id. at 70.
45. See id. at 68.
46. Id.
at 71.
47. Id.
48. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 71.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See supra note 26.
52. The plurality issued the court's opinion. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000).
Two Justices wrote concurring opinions. Id. at 75 (Souter, J., concurring), 80 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Three justices wrote dissenting opinions. Id.(Stevens, J., dissenting), 91 (Scalia,
J.,
dissenting), 93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 76-77 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
54. See id. at 77.
55. Id.
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right . . . to direct the upbringing of their children." 6 He allowed for
government intervention only if a state showed a compelling interest, rather
than merely a legitimate one. s7 In his opinion, the Washington trial court
premised its intervention on an illegitimate interest."8
Justice Stevens reasoned that the Washington Supreme Court improperly
invalidated the grandparent visitation statute on its face." He suggested that a
court may grant visitation rights to a third party without violating the
Constitution by showing that visitation is inthe child's best interest.6" Since the
Constitution permits some grants of visitation under the best interests standard,
Justice Stevens believed that the statute was facially valid."' Although he
agreed with the plurality's view that a court should presume a fit parent's
decision concerning visitation to be in the best interests of the child, he
emphasized that a third party may overcome that presumption. s2 Justice Stevens
further opined that a court should not require a non-parent to show potential
harm to the child before granting the non-parent visitation rights.6 3 Justice
Stevens stated that courts need to stress the child's interests in a visitation
petition, specifically the child's interest in maintaining a relationship with
persons to whom the child is close."
Like Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy stated that third parties need not
necessarily show harm to the child in order for the statute to pass constitutional
muster.65 Justice Kennedy further found that whether the best interest standard
should govern depends upon the relationship the third party has with the
child." Thus, the best interests standard is appropriate if, for example, the third
party at one time acted as the child's parent.67 Because the best interests
standard is appropriate in certain cases, Justice Kennedy would have refrained
from totally rejecting the standard.68
Justice Scalia found that the right of parents to rear their children falls short
69
ofbeing a fundamental right constitutionally protected from state interference.
In his view, the right to rear children is merely reserved to the people through
the Ninth Amendment.7 Justice Scalia concluded that consequently, a state

56. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).

57. Id.
58. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80.
59. Id. at 81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

60. Id.
61. Id. at 85.
62. Id. at 89-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

63. Id. at 85.
64. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88.
65. Id. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see id. at 85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 100-01 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

67. Id.
68. Id. at 101.
69. Id. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91-92. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONsT. amend. IX.
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legislature has the power to pass a law preventing interference with a parent's
right to make decisions concerning their child's upbringing, but the federal
courts lack the power to create such a right.7'
In analyzing the constitutionality of the South Carolina grandparent
visitation statute, it is important to keep certain factors in mind. First, only four
Justices signed the Court's opinion in Troxel, underscoring the wide
disagreement among them regarding grandparent visitation.72 Second, the
plurality expressly refused to set forth a test to determine the constitutionality
of granting visitation rights to grandparents.73 The Court also declined to decide
whether a court must base an award of visitation to a third party upon potential
harm to the child in the absence of visitation.74 Finally, the plurality held that
the Washington statute was unconstitutional as appliedto Ms. Granville.75 For
that reason, the Constitutionality of a grandparent visitation statute depends
greatly upon the particular facts of a case.
III. APPLICATION OF THE TROXEL TEST
In Cabralv. Cabralthe Missouri Court of Appeals applied the analysis
from Troxel in its opinion upholding the constitutionality of its own state
statute permitting grandparent visitation rights.76 In Brice v. Brice, the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals also applied the Troxel analysis to its state
grandparent visitation statute, but found its statute (as applied) violated the due
process rights of the child's mother.77 Viewing the South Carolina statute
through the analysis used by these two courts suggests that the South Carolina
grandparent visitation statute would be held constitutional.
A. Missouri-Cabralv. Cabral
In Cabral the parents of the child involved denied the grandparents any
opportunity to see their grandchild after the child turned six months old.7" Upon
the grandparents' petition for visitation, the trial court awarded them one brief
period of visitation with the child every three months.79 The court allowed the
parents to be present while the grandparents exercised their visitation rights.8 "
The child's parents appealed this award and challenged the constitutionality of

71. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer joined Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion. Id. at 60.
73. Id. at 73.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Cabral v. Cabral (In re G.P.C.), 28 S.W.3d 357,360 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
77. See Brice v. Brice, 754 A.2d 1132, 1133 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
78. Cabral,28 S.W.3d at 360.
79. Id. at 361.
80. Id.
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the Missouri statute under which the grandparents petitioned for visitation
rights with their grandchild.8 '
The Missouri statute allows the court to award grandparent visitation rights
in limited cases.8 2 Courts have the power to award visitation rights to
grandparents where the child's parents divorce, a family member adopts the
child, the parents preclude the grandparents from visiting the child,83 or when
visitation is in the "best interests of the child."" The Missouri Court ofAppeals
found this statute constitutional under Troxelbecause it is more restrictive than
Washington's statute and provides more protections for the parents' due
process rights. 5
The Missouri Court of Appeals noted that the first difference between the
two statutes involved the limitations on the face of the Missouri statute that
were not on the face ofthe Washington statute. 6 While the Washington statute
allows the court to award anyone visitation with the child, the Missouri statute
allows only grandparents to petition for visitation. 7 The Missouri Court of
Appeals further emphasized that courts may not award visitation under its
statute unless the parents deny visitation to the grandparents,"8 whereas the
Washington statute allowed the person desiring visitation rights to petition for
those rights at any time. 9
The Missouri Court of Appeals also noted that under its statute, unlike
under the Washington statute, the judge lacks the sole power to determine a
child's best interests." The Missouri statute instead allows the judge to select
a guardian ad litem to help determine the best interests of the child."'
The final difference between Cabraland Troxel noted by the Missouri
Court of Appeals concerns the actual award of visitation granted by the trial

81. Id. at 360.
82. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.402 (Supp. 2000).
83. Id. § 452.402.1. When one parent dies, a court has the power to award grandparent
visitation when the surviving parent denies the grandparent "reasonable visitation rights." Id.
When both parents are living, the court has the power to award grandparent visitation only if the
parents have "unreasonably denied visitation with the child for a period exceeding ninety days."
Id.
84. Id. § 452.402.2.
85. Cabral,28 S.W.3d at 364.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Courts also have the power to award visitation when the parents divorce or a
relative adopts the child. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.402 (1), (4) (Supp. 2000). However, those
subsections are not at issue in Cabral.See Cabral,28 S.W.3d at 362.
89. See WASH. REv. CODEANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1997).
90. Cabral,28 S.W.3d at 364.
91. Id.; see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.402.3 (Supp. 2000). However, this argument may be of
limited effect, because the Troxel decision does not indicate that the judge made a determination
of the best interests of the children. The Washington Code allows the judge to appoint an
attorney to protect a child's interest in a visitation action. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.10.070 (West 1997).
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courts. The Missouri trial court granted a much more modest visitation award
than the Washington court awarded in Troxel.93 The court, with this analysis,
refrained from setting a specific constitutional standard, but instead emphasized
that the specific award granted by the trial court is a factor in determining
whether the award is constitutional.94
B. Maryland-Bricev. Brice
In Brice the parents of the child's deceased father brought a petition for
court-ordered visitation rights with the child.9" The Maryland grandparent
visitation statute permitted the court to award reasonable amounts ofvisitation
'
to grandparents if doing so is "in the best interests of the child."96
Although the

child's mother allowed the grandparents to see the child, the grandparents
wanted more visitation time.' The child's mother created a visitation schedule
for the grandparents, but she opposed any court-ordered visitation rights.9"
Agreeing that the mother's visitation schedule gave the grandparents adequate
time to see the child, the trial court adopted the schedule as court-ordered
periods of visitation against the mother's wishes.99 The Maryland Court of
Special Appeals agreed to hear an appeal of the decision."°
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals used the analysis in Troxel to find
that the Maryland grandparent visitation statute, as applied to the facts ofBrice,
unconstitutionally infringed upon the due process rights of the child's
mother.' o' The Maryland Court of Special Appeals found that its statute offered
more protection to a child's parents than the extremely broad statute at issue in
Troxel." However, the limited protections offered by the Maryland statute did
too little to protect the constitutional right of the child's mother to rear her child
in this case.0 3 The Maryland statute allowed only grandparents to petition for
visitation.' 4 Other than that one limitation, the Maryland statute offered no

92. See Cabral,28 S.W.3d at 364.
93. See id. (comparing the two visitation awards: the award in Troxel included one
weekend every month and one week during the summer, while the award in Cabralwas for only
two hours every three months).
94. See id. at 364-65.
95. Brice v. Brice, 754 A.2d 1132, 1133 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
96. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (1999).
97. Brice, 754 A.2d at 1133-34.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1134.
100. Id.
101. See idat 1136.
102. Id. at 1136.
103. See Brice, 754 A.2d at 1136.
104. Id.
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more protection than the Washington statute.' 5 The Maryland Court of Special
Appeals believed that merely limiting a visitation statute to grandparents does
too little to protect a parent's due process rights under the ruling from Troxel,
especially since the Supreme Court found the Washington statute
unconstitutional as appliedto grandparents.'"Had Washington's statute been
limited to grandparents, it still would have infringed upon the parent's due
process rights under the ruling in Troxel.' °7
In finding the Maryland statute unconstitutional as applied in Brice, the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals relied heavily on the parents allowing some
visitation to the grandparents.' The court also noted that the grandparents did
not question the mother's ability as a parent. 0 9 As noted in Troxel, a court
should give special weight to the decisions a parent makes with regards to the
child if the court finds the parent is fit."'
IV. THE SOUTH CAROLINA GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTE AND CASE
LAW UNDER TROXEL ANALYSIS

South Carolina originally enacted a statute providing for grandparent
visitation in 1981."' South Carolina's current law provides more detail and
guidance for the courts than the first statute that the legislature passed." '2 The
current version of the South Carolina grandparent visitation statute provides:
The family court shall have exclusive jurisdiction: .... To order
periods of visitation for the grandparents of a minor child where either
105. Compare MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (1999) (allowing a court to grant
"reasonable visitation" to grandparents if "in the best interests of the child," but imposing no
other restrictions) with WASH. REV.CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1997) (allowing the court
to award visitation to "any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child").
106. Brice v. Brice, 754 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67-68 (2000).
111. See supranote 2 and accompanying text.
112. Before its amendment in 1994, the South Carolina visitation statute gave the family
court the power "[to order periods of visitation for the grandparents of the child." S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Law. Co-op. 1976). The family court had the power to decide whether to
award visitation to grandparents depending upon the facts of the case and the child's particular
situation. 13 S.C. JuR. Divorce § 36 (1992). The language of the former statute provided little
guidance for the courts to protect the constitutional rights ofparents. In the decision from Troxel,
the Supreme Court recognized that courts decide to award grandparent visitation based upon the
particular facts in each case. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,73 (2000). Even though the former
South Carolina statute failed to provide specific protection of the parents' constitutional rights,
the statute may have still been constitutional. The constitutionality of the statute depends upon
how the court interprets the statute and how much restraint the court uses in awarding visitation
rights to grandparents. See id. at 67 (implying the Washington courts had the chance to read the
statute in a more restrictive manner, and such a reading may have kept the statute within the
limits of the Constitution).
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or both parents of the minor child is or are deceased, or are divorced,
or are living separate and apart in different habitats regardless of the
existence of a court order or agreement, and upon written finding that
the visitation rights would be in the best interests of the child and
would not interfere with the parent/child relationship. In determining
whether to order visitation for the grandparents, the court shall
consider the nature of the relationship between the child and his
grandparents prior to the filing of the petition or complaint." 3
Because courts have published few opinions dealing with the new version of
the statute, case law under the old statute helps further explain when South
4
Carolina courts have awarded visitation rights to a child's grandparents."
The plurality in Troxel was particularly concerned with the ability of
anyone to petition for visitation without the court giving special weight to a
parent's decision to oppose visitation."' The South Carolina statute allows only
grandparents to petition for visitation," 6 as opposed to allowing "any person"
to petition for visitation. 17 This restriction alone narrows the breadth of the
South Carolina statute considerably. However, because the Supreme Court
invalidated the Washington statute as applied to grandparents,this limitation
fails to ensure the constitutionality of the South Carolina statute.'
The South Carolina statute is further limited because it allows courts to
grant visitation rights to grandparents only where one of the child's parents has
passed away, the parents are divorced, or they are living apart. " 9 The
Washington statute at issue in Troxel contained no such limitation.' 20 The South
Carolina Supreme Court limited the situations where courts may award
grandparent visitation even before the South Carolina legislature enacted the
amended statute because it required visitation rights for grandparents to be
derivative and refused to grant visitation where the parent (the child of the
grandparent petitioner) enjoyed the privilege of visitation with the child.' 2' The

113. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Supp. 1999).
114. Since the 1994 amendment, only one published South Carolina appellate decision has
cited section 20-7-420(33). See Dodge v. Dodge, 332 S.C. 401,415-16,505 S.E.2d 344,351 (Ct.
App. 1998).
115. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
116. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Supp. 1999).
117. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1997).
118. See Brice v. Brice, 754 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (noting
Maryland's visitation statute only protects grandparents, but the minor limitation is not enough
for the court to uphold the statute, as applied, against a constitutional challenge because the
Supreme Court in Troxel held Washington's statute unconstitutional as applied, and Troxel
involved a petition by grandparents for visitation rights).
119. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Supp. 1999).
120. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 29.10.160(3) (West 1997).
121. See Brown v. Eamhardt, 302 S.C. 374, 377, 396 S.E.2d 358, 360 (1990) (approving
the view that grandparent visitation rights derive from the rights of the parent to visitation and
stating courts should rarely grant grandparent visitation rights where that parent has visitation
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South Carolina Court of Appeals has continued to apply this restriction, even
after the legislature enacted the amended statute."
The South Carolina statute requires proof that "visitation rights would be
in the best interests of the child."'" Even before the legislature amended the
statute, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld use of the "best interests of
the child" standard to determine whether a court should award grandparents
visitation rights with their grandchild.'"
Scholars have recognized the difficulty in applying the best interests
standard in the context of grandparent visitation and have argued that the best
interests standard imposes few limitations onjudges. 25 Because the decision
to award visitation rights to a grandparent typically results in less serious
repercussions for the child than visitation awards to parents, 26 courts have
difficulty concluding that an award or denial of visitation rights will serve the
child's best interest. 2 7 Further, ajudge faces the problem of determining what
standards (specifically, what area of the child's life and what period of time)
to use to determine the child's best interest.'
The South Carolina statute requires written proof that the visitation serves
the "best interests of the child."' 29 In comparison to the statute at issue in
Troxel, the South Carolina Statute differs only in this requirement. The
Supreme Court in Troxel declined to criticize all uses of the best interests
standard in grandparent visitation cases; rather, the Court criticized using the
best interest standard without evaluating other factors to protect the due process
rights of the child's parent, specifically the weight of a fit parent's decision and

rights).

122. See Dodge v. Dodge, 332 S.C. 401,416-17,505 S.E.2d 344,352 (Ct. App. 1998) (reaffirming the requirement ofBrown that grandparent visitation rightsbe derivative in most cases,
even after the 1994 amendment to the grandparent visitation statute).
123. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Supp. 1999).
124. Chavis v. Witt, 285 S.C. 77, 80, 328 S.E.2d 74, 75 (1985). The South Carolina
Supreme Court later distinguished this case, but in doing so it still applied the best interest
standard to determine the grandparents' right to visitation, although it found such an award was
not in the child's best interest in the case before the court. Brown v. Earnhardt, 302 S.C. 374,
376-78, 396 S.E.2d 358, 359-60 (1990).
125. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin, Child-CustodyAdjudication: JudicialFunctionsin the
Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 260-61 (1975) (describing the
difficulty in applying the best interest standard in any case); Shandling, supra note 4, at 123
(arguing the best interests of the child are unclear in the context of grandparent visitation, and
the best interest standard imposes few limitations on judges).
126. Shandling, supranote 4, at 123.
127. Id.
128. Mnookin, supra note 125, at 260-61 (arguing that the judge must decide between
advancing the child's long-term or short-term interest, along with whether to focus on the child's
happiness, spiritual life, economic well-being, or any number ofother possibilities, any ofwhich
may be in some form the child's best interest).
129. S.C. CODEANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Supp. 1999).
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the requirement that the grandparents show special factors to justify the grant
of visitation. 3 '
The Missouri Court of Appeals has noted that Missouri's statute limits the
trial judge's power by providing for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to
help determine the child's best interests.' The South Carolina provision, like
the Missouri statute, gives the family court the power to appoint a guardian ad
when there is a possibility
litem to protect a child's interests,"' for example,
33
visitation could cause harm to the child.
The South Carolina statute does not specifically assign weight or
presumptive validity to a parent's decision to oppose visitation. 34 In the context
of child custody, the South Carolina Supreme Court recognizes that courts
should presume custody of a child should be given to the natural parents, and
anyone wishing to oppose giving custody to the child's natural parent must
submit sufficient evidence to overcome this presumption. 35 The same rules of
law underlie visitation rights and custody rights. 36 Although South Carolina
decisions fail to specifically mention the presumption of validity given to a fit
parent's decision, family courts favor parents in custody cases.'37 Since
visitation derives from the same rules of law as custody cases, 3 ' South
Carolina courts may apply the presumption in favor of a parent's decision
to clearly express this
regarding visitation, although appellate decisions fail
1 39
presumption in the context of grandparent visitation.
Unlike Washington law, the South Carolina law on grandparent visitation
requires "special factors" to warrant the grant of visitation rights to
grandparents." 4 In addition to the statute's restrictions,' 4' South Carolina courts
130. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000).
131. Cabral v. Cabral (In re G.P.C.), 28 S.W.3d 357, 364 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); see Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 452A02.3 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
132. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(37) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999); 21 S.C. JUR.
Children and Families§ 118 (1993).
133. 21 S.C. JuR. Childrenand Families § 118 (1993).
134. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Supp. 1999).
135. Cook v. Cobb, 271 S.C. 136, 140, 245 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1978) (stating courts
recognize a rebuttable presumption that children should be returned to parents in custody
disputes); Dodge v. Dodge, 332 S.C. 401,415,505 S.E.2d 344,351 (Ct. App. 1998) (overturning
an award ofjoint custody between the natural father and the grandparents where "insufficient
weight was given to the strong presumption favoring the return of custody to the father");
Sanders v. Emery, 317 S.C. 230, 233, 452 S.E.2d 636, 638 (Ct. App. 1994) (overturning the
family court's decision because "insufficient weight was given to the strong presumption
favoring the return of custody to the home of fit biological parents").
136. 59 AM. Jun. 2D Parent& Child § 36 (1987).
137. See Cook, 271 S.C. at 140,245 S.E.2d at 614; Dodge, 332 S.C. at415, 505 S.E.2d at
351; Sanders, 317 S.C. at 233,452 S.E.2d at 638.
138. 59 AM. JuR.2D Parent& Child § 36 (1987).
139. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
140. See Brown v. Earnhardt, 302 S.C. 374, 377, 396 S.E.2d 358, 360 (1990) (finding
grandparents may not gain visitation rights while the child's parents have such rights "absent a
showing of exceptional circumstances"); Horton v. Vaughn, 309 S.C. 383, 388,423 S.E.2d 543,
545-46 (Ct. App. 1992) (overturning a family court's award of grandparent visitation because
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explicitly require "special circumstances" to support a grant of visitation to
grandparents. 42 Although43the courts fail to describe exactly what constitutes
"special circumstances,"' presumably the courts must find something more
to grant visitation rights to grandparents than to grant such rights to a child's
parent. This requirement serves to further protect parents from infringement of
their due process rights.
The South Carolina statute fails to require a showing of potential harm to
the child in order to grant visitation rights to grandparents.'" Since the
Supreme Court stopped short of requiring such a showing in Troxel,'" the
absence of such a provision from the South Carolina statute does not cause it
to unconstitutionally infringe on the due process rights of parents.
In Troxel, the Supreme Court expressed concern that the Washington court
failed to consider the fact that the Troxels' relationship with their grandchildren
was not in danger of being destroyed if the petition were denied." While the
South Carolina grandparent visitation statute fails to specifically require a
threat to the child's relationship with the grandparents to exist in order to award
visitation, 47 South Carolina courts account for whether a denial oftheir petition
for visitation would destroy the grandparents' relationship with their
grandchildren. 14 In considering this when deciding whether to award visitation
rights to grandparents, the South Carolina courts address the second concern
from TroxeL Since the constitutionality of a grandparent visitation statute

the record contained no "special circumstances warranting court-ordered visitation rights to the
Paternal Grandmother") (overruled on other grounds by Joiner v. Rivas, 342 S.C. 102,110,536
S.E.2d 372, 376 (2000) (overruling cases "requiring strict construction of TPR [termination of
parental rights] statutes")).
141. The statute allows courts to grant visitation to grandparents only where one parent
dies or the parents are divorced or living apart, after considering "the nature of the relationship
between the child and his grandparents." S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Supp. 1999).
142. Brown, 302 S.C. at 377,396 S.E.2d at 360 (finding no "exceptional circumstances");
Horton, 309 S.C. at 388, 423 S.E.2d at 545-46 (finding no "special circumstances").
143. See Brown, 302 S.C. at 377-78, 396 S.E.2d at 360 (noting the court finds "no
exceptional circumstance in this case warranting court-ordered visitation rights to the
grandparents," though not defining what constitutes an"exceptional circumstance"); Horton, 309
S.C. at 388, 423 S.E.2d at 545-46 (finding no "special circumstances warranting court-ordered
visitation" in the family court record, but failing to explain what it considers a "special
circumstance").
144. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Supp. 1999).
145. The plurality in Troxel specifically refused to decide the issue. Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000). Justices Stevens and Kennedy specifically concluded that the
Constitution does not require such a showing. Id. at 85 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 94 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
146. See id. at 71.
147. See § 20-7-420(33).
148. See Brown v. Earnhardt, 302 S.C. 374, 376, 396 S.E.2d 358,360 (1990) (noting that
denying the grandparents' petition for visitation rights would not destroy their relationship with
the child); Chavis v. Witt, 285 S.C. 77,79,328 S.E.2d 74,75 (1985) ("[W]hen a parent dies, the
relationship of the grandparents to the child of the deceased person is not obliterated.").
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depends upon how broadly the state courts interpret the statute, 49 the statute's
omission of a requirement that the grandparent-grandchild relationship be in
danger does not affect its constitutionality. The courts account for this factor
in applying the statute, thereby avoiding infringement upon the due process
rights of parents.
In order to protect a parent from excessive grants of visitation rights to
grandparents, the South Carolina statute requires a "written finding that the
visitation ights... would not interfere with the parent/child relationship" to

justify a grant of visitation to grandparents.' This portion of the statute offers
parents a great deal of protection. The South Carolina Supreme Court directs
lower courts to show caution in granting visitation rights to grandparents
because of the potential strain on the child's time.' Thus, the South Carolina
courts implicitly give deference to parents in visitation cases, although they fail
to specifically require lower courts to give such a presumption to the parent's
decisions.'5 2 The legislature, in codifying a protection for the parental
relationship against intrusion by grandparent visitation rights, further protects
a parent's liberty to rear their children."'
The current version of the South Carolina grandparent visitation statute
also requires the family court to take into account the strength of the
relationship between the grandparents and the child with whom they wish to
secure court-ordered visitation rights.' 54 Justice Stevens, in his dissent in
Troxel, expressed his concern for protecting a child's desire to continue seeing
those people with whom the child has developed strong bonds.' By requiring
a court to consider whether the petitioner has a strong relationship with the
child, the South Carolina grandparent visitation statute addresses this concern.
Requiring this consideration protects the child's parent from intrusion where
the grandparents have a minimal relationship with their grandchild, but it also
protects a child's well-developed relationship with her grandparents.
V. CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville falls
short of invalidating the South Carolina grandparent visitation statute.

149. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.

150. § 20-7-420(33).
151. See Brown, 302 S.C. at 376-78, 396 S.E.2d at 360.
152. See id.
153. See § 20-7-420(33) (requiring that visitation awarded to grandparents not "interfere
with the parent/child relationship").
154. Id. ("[T]he court shall consider the nature of the relationship between the child and
his grandparent.").
155. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Washington
Supreme Court also criticized the Washington statute for failing to require the persons requesting
visitation to show they have a strong bond with the child. See In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 31
(Wash. 1998) (en banc).
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Certainly, Troxel gives limited recognition that grandparent visitation laws may
infringe upon parental rights to decide who may visit with their child and when.
So long as the South Carolina courts continue to grant visitation rights to
grandparents only in limited circumstances, the granting of such visitation is
perfectly constitutional. The current South Carolina grandparent visitation
statute codifies many of these protections to help courts in their struggle to
award visitation rights to grandparents in certain limited instances while
avoiding infringement upon the due process rights of the child's parents.
Importantly, neither the South Carolina statute nor case law explicitly
states that courts should give special weight to the decisions made by a fit
parent permitting, denying, or limiting opportunities for grandparents to visit
with the child. The limitations the South Carolina statute and courts impose
provide enough protection to prevent unconstitutional infringement of the due
process rights of a child's parent in most cases. In light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Troxel, courts should explicitly give special weight to the decisions
made by a competent parent concerning visitation. The court has the power to
overrule the parent's decision, but only after the grandparents overcome the
burden of proving the court should award visitation.
If the South Carolina courts explicitly give special weight to a competent
parent's decision concerning visitation with the child and continue to apply the
limitations ofpast grandparent visitation petitions, their rulings will not infringe
upon the due process right of the child's parent to rear the child, as set forth in
Troxel v. Granville.
South Carolina courts cautiously award visitation rights to grandparents.
By showing caution, the courts protect the due process rights of the child's
parents. The South Carolina statute provides extensive protection for the due
process rights of a child's parents. While the Supreme Court may declare a
broad and expansive statute, made expansive by the language of the statute or
by broad interpretationby the court, unconstitutional, the South Carolina statute
faces no such danger. South Carolina law regarding grandparent visitation
rights contains sufficient safeguards to pass the constitutional test provided by
Troxel and protects the due process rights of parents while permitting courts to
award visitation rights to grandparents.
M.Ronald McMahan,Jr.
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